

DEVELOPMENT OF PUSHTOONISTAN PROBLEM

- I. In ethnographic terms, both south and southeastern Afghanistan and parts of the Northwest Frontier Province and the Baluchistan area of southwest Pakistan are inhabited by Afghan tribes who speak Pushtu language (OFTEN CALLED THE PATHANS).
 - A. Present Afghan royal family, which stems from Durani Afghan tribe, gained control of country in 1834.
- II. British-Afghan boundary decision lays basis for current Pushtoonistan problem.
 - A. "Durand Line," separating Afghanistan from British India, was established in 1893 by Sir Montimer Durand (representing British India) and Afghan ruler at that time, Amir Abdur Rahman.
 - B. "Line" was established in effort to check mutual encroachments on each other's claimed territory.

1. Agreement, with map, delimited

south and southeastern limits of
Amir's dominions.

2. Each party pledged not to interfere in territory across
"Durand Line."

C. Neither lived up wholly to letter of
agreement in subsequent years.

1. Afghans continued interest in
tribes, some of which were split
by Durand Line into Afghan and
Indian portions.

2. British continued to exert military and political influence in
Afghanistan to halt southward
march of Russian power.

III. Present Pushtoonistan dispute arose as
result of Afghan propaganda campaign
instituted after creation of Pakistan.

drawal from India nullified boundary treaty and argued that Pushtu-speaking Afghan tribesmen inhabiting new state of Pakistan should be permitted to establish autonomous state.

B. No mention made of Afghan tribesmen inside Afghanistan (who represent only one of several major tribal groups within the country and constitute only 44 percent of population) also joining autonomous state of Pushtoonistan.

IV. Pakistan claims there is no basis for Afghan argument, that Pak inherited all territory east of "Durand Line." Pak claim supported by following evidence:

A. In July 1947, government of British India held plebiscite in "administered" (i.e. settled) areas of Northwest Frontier Province.

1. 99.5 percent of vote favored

belonging to Pakistan rather
than to India.

- B. Simultaneously, British officials canvassed opinion in Northwest Frontier Province's "unadministered" tribal districts and obtained statements of tribal desires to join Pakistan.
- C. After founding of Pakistan (15 Aug '47), Pakistani government again obtained statements of loyalty from tribal leaders in frontier area.
- D. Pak stand on tribes was made official on 27 June 1950, when Pakistani government issued a formal "Notification" stating "Whereas the inhabitants of the (tribal) areas...have, through their accredited representatives, declared their territories to be a part of the Federation of

15th day of August 1947...the
areas aforesaid shall be deemed to
have been included in the Federa-
tion...as from the 15th day of
August, 1947."

- V. Liquidation of Pushtoonistan issue by
amalgamation or erection autonomous
state would involve unacceptable costs
to one or other of parties.
- A. If all Pushtu-speakers were detached
from Afghanistan, nation would
lose both capital (Kabul) and royal
family, as well as 44% of population.
- B. If Pushtus detached from Pakistan,
defense of all West Pakistan (now
based on Khyber) would be nearly
impossible.
- C. Autonomous state, moreover, would be
economically unviable, and present
even more troublesome political

SOVIET OFFER OF AUSTRIA TREATY

I. We believe the Soviet offer of peace treaty to Austria is genuine and that the USSR will proceed to negotiate and sign the treaty at the earliest opportunity.

II. Soviet action highly significant. Shift of position from that taken at Berlin -- demonstrates far greater flexibility than ~~for~~ in Stalin era.

A. Treaty offer marks first substantial Soviet concession in Europe since end World War II.

B. Considerable risk to Sov position in other Satellites:

Return to Sov of refugees-
Hungary will have boundary on free world
Legal basis for Sov troops in Hungary and Rumania will disappear, though may be revived by "Mutual Defense Pact" which was apparently negotiated last December.

1. While we have always estimated USSR's position in Austria not vital to Soviet, we have previously considered USSR would insist on tying settlement small Austrian problem to larger settlement on Germany (as Molotov said at Berlin).

B. Fact USSR now apparently willing to reverse long-standing policy of procrastination, settle Austrian treaty separately, indicates-- in our view--Soviet concern at recent international developments.

1. Bohlen reports, after recent talk with Bulganin, his impression of "greater degree of uncertainty and even concern in Soviet government at general international situation."

iii. Causes of apparent Soviet policy reversal many

and complex, but chief among them is probably Soviet concern over situation created by ratification of Paris accords.

A. Soviet are preoccupied with threat of a rearmed, pro-Western Germany,

B. French ratification of accords probably forced USSR to make move on Austria, to restore maneuverability on German question.

1. Kremlin must estimate that reunification plus neutralization, on Austrian model, will have powerful appeal and will lead to West German pressure for postponement rearmament while new negotiations take place.

~~2. USSR can still play it both ways: if~~

~~Austrian move has hoped-for~~

~~repercussions on German question,~~

~~Kremlin can go through with treaty, if it fails, can renege at last minute, blame West for failure.~~

- C. We believe that threatening situation in Far East, together with Soviet desire to reinforce neutralist opposition to US Far East policy, also a factor in USSR's Austrian gambit. However, USSR probably more concerned over European than over Far East problems.
- D. Another factor in Austrian gambit may have been Soviet desire to insure Austrian neutralization.
 - 1. Given likely Soviet suspicions that US plans bases in Western Austria, USSR may have been willing to pay price for Swiss-type neutrality.

2. Perhaps Soviets are moving toward
broader buffer zone of neutral states as

counter to US "encirclement."

3. *But hinted that Austrian pattern would not fit Germany*
- IV. One major lesson to be learned from Austrian

settlement is new flexibility of Soviet policy, and
possibility of further moves.

- A. Austrian move may reflect uncertainty
created by collective nature of Soviet
leadership and by its concern over recent
trend of cold war.

- B. In background may be Soviet worry over
nuclear arms race.

1. Despite Moscow's careful repudiation
of Malenkov remark that World War III
could mean end of civilization, Mikoyan
last week told Austrian State Secretary
Kreisky that Soviet development of
nuclear weapons had involved "frightful
cost."

V If Soviets go through with treaty, little
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likelihood they expect to subvert Austria through
Austrian Communist Party.

A. Kreisky says Soviets made clear during
Moscow talks they had little sympathy
for Austrian C.P. Mikoyan told him "do
not confuse us with Austrian CP. That
party has given us bad reputation in
Austria, wrecked our business assets, and
it has no political future."